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• Third, in the short run, there may be effects
that bring criticism on the inflation hawks—
a higher interest rate might increase unem-
ployment, and a lower interest rate might
reduce unemployment. But, given the long-
run relationship already discussed, analyz-
ing short-run issues requires special care
to be sure that the short run is linked cor-
rectly to the long run.
• Fourth, we need to examine issues of vari-
ability around the averages. I believe there
is a compelling case that both inflation and
unemployment are more variable when
the average inflation rate is higher. I also
believe that Fed policy can contribute to
employment stability while keeping infla-
tion low, but this belief is more of a conjec-
ture than something I can demonstrate.
• Fifth, and finally, I insist that the only rea-
sonable way to think about monetary policy
is in the context of uncertainty. Policy-
makers have to play the odds. A fair assess-
ment of the performance of policymakers
requires a Friday view, not a Monday-
morning view after the game has been
played. In an inherently uncertain environ-
ment, policymakers should not be criticized
for being unable to guess what shocks the
future will bring, only for making bad bets
before the future arrives.
Before proceeding, I want to emphasize that
the views I express here are mine and do not nec-
essarily reflect official positions of the Federal
Reserve System. I thank my colleagues at the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis for their com-
ments, but I retain full credit for errors.
I
start with a confession: my title this morn-
ing reflects personal frustration over the
public debate concerning a critically impor-
tant monetary policy issue. The issue con-
cerns the relationship between monetary policy
and unemployment. My frustration reflects the
fact that I am often called an “inflation hawk,”
with the implication, at least as it touches my
thin skin, that I care little about unemployment.
Further, the implication seems to be that those
urging the Federal Reserve to keep pushing inter-
est rates lower and lower are the true friends of
the unemployed. I reject this analysis completely,
and I’ll tell you why. Low inflation, far from
being the enemy of the unemployed, is a friend.
Let me outline this argument, which I’ll then
develop in more detail, step by step.
• First, economists of all stripes agree that
over the long run there is no significant
tradeoff between the average rate of inflation
and the average rate of unemployment.
Therefore, on average over time, an easier
monetary policy does not yield lower unem-
ployment but does yield higher inflation,
all other things being equal. By the same
argument, a tighter monetary policy does
not yield higher unemployment, but does
yield lower inflation.
• Second, so long as the inflation rate remains
low, policy actions changing the federal
funds rate up or down should be expected
to have little effect on bond yields in the
long run. In particular, a higher fed funds
rate that heads off incipient inflation is
friendly to bond investors.THE LONG RUN
Let’s begin the analysis with a discussion of
long-run relationships. The issue here is the
relationship between variables on the average
over a substantial period, such as a decade. The
calendar period must be long enough, depending
on the relationship being examined, that adjust-
ments to transitory events, or shocks, are complete.
Thirty years ago, macroeconomists were
embroiled in a spirited debate as to whether there
was a long-run tradeoff between inflation and
unemployment. On the one side were economists
who believed that the economy could generate
lower unemployment on the average if society
were willing to accept higher inflation, at least
up to a point. Practically speaking, the debate
centered around the possibility that the U.S. econ-
omy operating permanently at, say, 5 percent
annual inflation would generate lower average
unemployment than would the economy operat-
ing at an annual inflation rate of, say, 1 percent.
Economists who believed in the long-run
tradeoff believed that experience in the United
Kingdom and the United States supported their
view. They also believed that that there were some
theoretical reasons for believing in the tradeoff.
Economists on the other side of the debate believed
that markets are fundamentally regulated by well-
informed, profit-making firms and well-informed,
utility-maximizing households. In such an econ-
omy, we should not expect that ongoing inflation
could “buy” lower unemployment. The central
reason is that everyone should, at least eventually,
see through the fiction of rising wages and prices.
Nothing “real” should be affected by ongoing
inflation. Why, for example, should anyone work
more hours per week, or delay retirement, when
wages and prices are rising at 5 percent per year
than when wages and prices are rising by 1 percent
per year?
By the mid-1970s, this issue was decided.
Mainstream macroeconomists across the spectrum
of professional opinion, except at the very ends,
agreed that neither theory nor evidence justified
the view that there could be a long-run tradeoff
between inflation and unemployment. Thus, a
government policy that yielded permanently
higher inflation would not buy lower unemploy-
ment. Nor would policies yielding lower long-run
inflation cost higher unemployment on average
over the long run.
In the context of long-run analysis, the out-
standing issue came to be the numerical estimate
of what some called the “natural rate of unem-
ployment,” and what others called the “non-
accelerating inflation rate of unemployment,” or
NAIRU. (I’ll skip over the esoterica of possible
differences in the meanings of these two terms.)
If the inflation rate settled down to a steady 5 per-
cent per year, or 8 percent per year, or 1 percent
per year, what would be the equilibrium rate of
unemployment in the labor market? The profes-
sion converged on a number in the neighborhood
of 6 percent, although some thought the estimate
should be higher and some lower.
Although many involved in this debate
thought their estimates of the natural rate were
secure, others believed that such estimates carried
a high degree of imprecision. Most believe that
today the natural rate is lower than it used to be,
although I do not intend to dig into this subject
this morning.
The important point is that the profession
did converge on the proposition that the rate of
unemployment would not be lower in the long
run if society accepted a higher rate of inflation.
The upshot of this argument is my first and most
important point this morning: The proposition
that a hard line on inflation will yield higher
unemployment is simply not accepted in the
economics profession. Except at the fringes,
economists who are politically liberal or politi-
cally conservative on a wide variety of other issues
agree on this proposition.
I think, in fact, that on the average in the long
run it is possible that lower inflation, all other
things equal, may be associated with lower unem-
ployment. Moreover, I believe there is a compelling
case that lower inflation, all other things equal,
is good for economic growth. A market economy
works more efficiently, and fiscal and regulatory
distortions are less serious, when the inflation
rate is low and stable. The Federal Reserve can
contribute to maximum sustainable economic
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bility, or very low and stable inflation if you
prefer to state the goal this way.
Over the long run, however, rates of unem-
ployment and economic growth are determined
primarily by nonmonetary conditions. It is easy
to demonstrate this point by comparing U.S. and
Eurozone experience. Both areas have had similar
inflation rates over the last 15 years or so, but
unemployment in major continental European
countries has been far higher than in the United
States. France, for example, has had an unemploy-
ment rate above 9 percent every year since 1984.
Although my focus this morning is on mone-
tary policy and unemployment, I should comment
briefly about the implications of my argument
for interest rates. Over the long run, the average
level of nominal interest rates is determined pri-
marily by the average rate of inflation. The higher
the rate of inflation is on the average, the higher
average interest rates will be. A successful mone-
tary policy that maintains price stability, therefore,
is not only employment-friendly but also interest-
rate-friendly. I do not know what policy actions
will be appropriate later this year, but I want to
emphasize that it is simply not true that increases
in the funds rate cause lasting increases in bond
rates. For example, the Fed raised the federal funds
rate significantly over the course of 1994, but by
December 1995, the 30-year Treasury bond rate
ended up lower than it had been in January 1994.
From reading the financial press over the last
couple of weeks, it seems that bond investors are
jittery over the possibility that the Fed might raise
the federal funds rate later this year. Investors
ought instead to be reassured that the Fed will, if
necessary—and I emphasize the if—raise rates to
keep inflation low. Bond investors have far more
to fear from a sustained rise in the rate of inflation
than they do from the ups and downs of the fed-
eral funds rate required to keep the economy on
an even keel.
To summarize, higher inflation does not buy
lower unemployment; if anything, price stability
yields the lowest possible unemployment rate,
all other things being equal. Moreover, price sta-
bility contributes to achieving maximum sustain-
able economic growth. Economists can and do
argue about the magnitudes of these employment
effects, but broadly agree on their direction.
Finally, maintaining low inflation on the average
will be bond-investor-friendly.
THE SHORT RUN
If there is no long-run tradeoff such that
unemployment is lower when inflation is higher,
then perhaps the matter at issue concerns a short-
run tradeoff. What might be involved here?
There are several different ways to examine
the short-run logic. Suppose, for example, we
consider a hypothetical experiment in which a
central bank has been pursuing a policy for a
long time that yields 2 percent annual inflation.
Now suppose the central bank changes its policy
to one that yields a long-run rate of inflation of
2.5 percent per year. During the transition to the
higher rate, the more expansionary monetary
policy might for a time bid down the unemploy-
ment rate. But given the fact that there is no long-
run tradeoff, the decline in unemployment will
be temporary. The net result is that the easier
monetary policy yields a temporary reduction
of unemployment and a permanent increase of
inflation.
Another version of this argument goes some-
thing like this: Suppose a favorable disturbance—
such as a technological change that raises the rate
of productivity growth—impacts the economy. If
the central bank maintains monetary policy as is,
perhaps the inflation rate drops from 2 percent
per year to 1.5 percent per year. A somewhat more
expansionary policy, on the other hand, might
keep the inflation rate at 2 percent per year but
yield a temporary bonus: reducing the unemploy-
ment rate for a time. In this case, the unchanged
monetary policy “buys” a permanently lower
inflation rate in exchange for an unchanged rate
of unemployment; the alternative monetary policy
keeps the inflation rate unchanged but yields a
temporarily lower unemployment rate. These two
cases are essentially the same except that the end
result is a different inflation rate. The cases are the
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policy per se, ignoring other things going on such
as the change in productivity growth, is the same
in both examples.
I have no doubt that excessive Fed tightening
would raise the unemployment rate. To use an
absurd example, if the Fed were to raise the federal
funds rate from its current level of 5 percent to 10
percent tomorrow and keep it there, the unem-
ployment rate would rise substantially. Some
people seem to reason that if a big increase in
the funds rate would cause a big increase in the
unemployment rate, then a small increase in the
funds rate would logically cause a small increase
in the unemployment rate. But that argument is
flawed. When economic conditions are shifting,
as they almost always are, small adjustments in
the federal funds rate, one way or the other, may
be required to maintain price stability and prevent
the development of inflation or deflation, either
of which would destabilize employment.
To summarize the short-run argument, under
some conditions it is true that a more expansion-
ary monetary policy might yield temporarily lower
unemployment, and a less expansionary monetary
policy might yield temporarily higher unemploy-
ment. There may be times when the Federal
Reserve will have to make an explicit choice
about whether to pursue, or permit, these tem-
porary effects. It is also true that a major policy
mistake could quickly have major effects on
unemployment. The problem is to figure out how
to avoid mistakes by making timely adjustments
in the federal funds rate to keep the economy on
a smooth, noninflationary track.
LOW INFLATION AND
EMPLOYMENT STABILITY
I believe that the traditional analysis of both
the long run and the short run is correct and
important. Economists have also noted another
important point that bears directly on today’s
policy issues—the higher the average rate of
inflation, the more volatile the economy seems
to be. The variability of both inflation and employ-
ment is statistically higher when the average rate
of inflation is higher. The recessions of 1973-75
and 1981-82, which were quite severe, were a
direct consequence of rising inflation and rising
inflation expectations. Between 1965 and 1985,
unemployment may have averaged around 6 per-
cent, but it swung between 3.5 and 9.7 percent
on an annual average basis. If we compare two
economies, both with the same average unem-
ployment rate, everyone will agree that the econ-
omy with the more stable unemployment rate is
preferable to the one with a widely fluctuating
unemployment rate.
The correlation between a fluctuating inflation
rate and a fluctuating unemployment rate is far
from accidental. Uncertainty by businesses and
households about the inflation rate leads them to
make decisions that turn out, willy-nilly, to be
mistaken in the light of subsequent events. It is
simply very difficult to plan efficiently when
prices in the aggregate are changing rapidly. Some-
times the mistakes are on one side, and sometimes
on the other side. The net result of an unstable
inflation environment is that swings in the busi-
ness cycle become unavoidable. Therefore, my
personal conviction is that the central bank must
not take chances with the inflation rate; if inflation
gets away from us, a recession will not be far
behind. It is for this reason that I consider my
stance as a so-called inflation hawk to be that of
a friend of the unemployed, or potentially unem-
ployed, should there be a recession.
My conjecture is that timely policy actions
can help to stabilize employment without affecting
either the long-run average rate of unemployment
or average rate of inflation. For example, I believe
that timely Fed action last fall helped to prevent
financial market disturbances following the
Russian default from feeding into the real econ-
omy. Still, I believe that we know so little about
these issues on a systematic basis that the propo-
sition needs to be offered as a conjecture. And
because our knowledge is so limited, we have to
be careful as policymakers that efforts to cushion
short-run shocks do not turn into policy actions
that inadvertently are more expansionary or con-
tractionary than is consistent with the paramount
long-run objective of price stability.
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An essential feature of policymaking under
uncertainty is that the policymaker must play
the odds. Of course, we want to stack the odds as
much in our favor as possible, but having done
everything we can to improve the odds, we must
still make some bets based on probabilities. This
view of the policy problem is not peculiar to
monetary policy, but prevails in all areas of public
and private decisionmaking where actions today
must be taken in the context of uncertainties about
the future, and even about the current situation.
One of the frustrations I feel as I read all the
policy advice directed the Fed’s way is that some
commentators fail to analyze which risks are
worth taking and how to calculate the odds. A
comprehensive policy analysis requires that we
consider all possible scenarios and their probabil-
ities. The next step is to consider various policy
options and the likely economic outcomes under
each of the scenarios. That’s how I approach pol-
icymaking. Of course, I also take account of the
fact that policy is not etched in stone but can be
adjusted over time, that policy actions yield policy
effects with a lag, and so forth.
It is easy to see that the exercise becomes
complex pretty quickly, but that is what must be
faced in any comprehensive policy analysis. I
myself am convinced that a significant increase
in inflation, especially if accompanied by growing
concerns in the marketplace about the future rate
of inflation, would adversely affect economic out-
comes. It is important to understand that policy
depends on both the desired outcome and the
flow of data about the economy that affects the
probabilities of various scenarios. It is therefore
not just unwise but impossible for me to forecast
my own position at the next FOMC meeting,
because that position is subject to revision based
on new information.
ENDPIECE
I’ll finish by drawing the threads of this argu-
ment together, but in a way that is a bit different
than my argument above. The Federal Reserve’s
contribution to maximum sustainable economic
growth is to pursue monetary policy focused on
price stability, to maintain an efficient and reliable
payments system, and to foster a safe banking
system. The central bank is not responsible for
other key drivers of economic growth. These
include, in no particular order, the education
system, the maintenance of public safety, the
efficient allocation of resources through govern-
mental tax and spending programs, the culture
of entrepreneurship, invention and technical
progress, and so forth.
Suppose the central bank were successful in
achieving low and steady inflation through a
control mechanism based on regulating of the
amount of money in the economy. Then interest
rates—which by assumption are not directly con-
trolled by the central bank—would fluctuate up
and down as various events and shocks occurred.
In fact, the Federal Reserve does use the federal
funds rate as its short-run policy instrument. A
successful policy requires, therefore, that the Fed
adjust the funds rate up and down as necessary
to be consistent with price stability. What actions
are necessary is never perfectly clear, and mistakes
are always possible. But it simply cannot be the
case that every federal funds rate increase is
worker-unfriendly. If that were the case, then we
should expect a policy yielding price stability
and full employment to be accompanied by a
permanently declining trend to interest rates, a
nonsensical expectation.
Finally, a policy yielding price stability will
also yield a flat trend around which the federal
funds rate will fluctuate. The long bond yield,
which reflects the average of expected short rates
over the life of the bond, should fluctuate rela-
tively little in this environment. Timely Fed
action to raise the funds rate when required to
maintain price stability is, therefore, not only
worker-friendly but also bond-investor-friendly.
I’ve said my piece, and hope that from now on
the press will refer to me as an “unemployment
dove.” But I doubt it!
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